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"Necessity" in Condemnation Cases-
Who Speaks for the People?
By MICHAEL V. MCINTIRE*
"Pave Paradise
Put up a parking lot."
Big Yellow Taxi
IN August 1970 a United States district court halted the construction
of a freeway bridge and interchanges in the District of Columbia at the
behest of property owners and others who proved, inter alia, that the
bridge as then designed was, in the words of the Federal Highway
Administrator, "extremely hazardous and fraught with danger."' If the
identical situation had occurred in California, the California state courts
would have refused to grant relief.
In 1969, a United States district court enjoined the construction of
a freeway requiring the filling of a portion of the Hudson River on the
grounds that Congress had prohibited such activity without specific
congressional approval, and that no such approval had been granted.'
California state courts, however, refuse to hear evidence of such illegality
when offered by a landowner seeking to save his land from an unau-
thorized taking.
In July 1969 a United States district court in California enjoined
the construction of a freeway through a national park and forest to a
proposed ski resort on the grounds that the permits for such construc-
tion were illegally issued by federal agencies.3 The court of appeals
reversed, not on the merits, but because plaintiff, the Sierra Club, did
not have a sufficient interest in the action to bring the law suit.4 By
curious coincidence, the persons who have the most direct economic in-
* B.S., 1957, Notre Dame University; J.D., 1963, University of Wisconsin;
Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; Member, California Bar.
I. District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754,
792 (D.D.C. 1970).
2. Citizen's Comm. v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), a!f'd, 425 F.2d
97 (2d Cir. 1970).
3. Sierra Club v. Hickel, Memorandum Dec. Civil No. 51464 (N.D. Cal. July 23,
1969).
4. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
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terest-those whose property would be taken to construct this "illegal"
project-are precluded by California law from attacking the State Divi-
sion of Highways in the state court on the same grounds.
In Illinois, in 1961, the Park Board of a Chicago suburb moved
to condemn the sites of two new, integrated subdivisions for use as a
park after it learned that the developments were to be interracial. The
Illinois Supreme Court allowed the developer to introduce evidence that
the sole purpose of the condemnation was to prevent the plaintiffs from
constructing the integrated subdivisions.5 In California, however, the
developer would not have been able to question the board's motive.
California courts are closed to litigants-at least to land-owning
litigants-in cases like the foregoing because of a 1959 decision by the
California Supreme Court in People ex rel. Department of Public Works
v. Chevalier.6 In that landmark decision, the court declared:
[Wlhere the owner of land sought to be condemned for an estab-
lished public use is accorded his constitutional right to just compen-
sation for the taking, the condemning body's "motives or reasons
for declaring that it is necessary to take the land are no concern
of his."T
At this critical time in the nation's history, when a myriad of tech-
nical, sociological and economic problems are challenging the very
core of the federal system of government, and when all branches of
government are required to put shoulder to the wheel to meet these chal-
lenges, such a judicial abrogation of responsibility is not only inexcusa-
ble, but dangerous.
I. History of Judicial Avoidance of "Necessity" Questions
Almost from the beginning of statehood, California courts have
demonstrated a disturbing tendency to avoid reviewing decisions made
by a condemning authority as to the location of or necessity for a public
works project." They have taken this position in spite of an enactment
by the legislature in 1872, continued to the present day, which specifi-
cally provides:
Before property can be taken, it must appear: 1. That the use to
which it is applied is the use authorized by law; 2. That the taking is
necessary to such use. .... 9
5. Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850
(1961).
6. People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959).
7. Id. at 307, 340 P.2d at 603, quoting County of Los Angeles v. Rindge Co.,
53 Cal. App. 166, 174, 200 P. 27, 31 (1921), afl'd, 262 U.S. 700 (1922).
8. See, e.g., cases cited notes 10, 17, 29 infra.
9. CAL. CoDE Civ. Pnoc. § 1241.
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As early as 1891, the court began limiting the scope of that stat-
ute. In Pasadena v. Simpson10 the court permitted a condemnee to pre-
sent evidence to prove that a taking by the City of Pasadena for a sewer
system was not necessary, but took a narrow view of the word "neces-
sary:
When a city or town decides for itself-as it may do-that a sewer
is desirable, it is not bound to prove that such sewer is necessary,
but only that the taking of the property it seeks to condemn is neces-
sary for the construction of the sewer."
The court then ruled that the location as determined by the condemning
authority must be presumed to be correct and could only be overcome
by very strong proof.'"
Several years later, in Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors,'3 the same
court refused to review a resolution of the San Francisco Board of Su-
pervisors declaring that the taking of petitioner's property was necessary
for the extension of Market Street. In its decision the court noted
that governing statutes provided petitioner with an opportunity to be
heard before the city council, which had power to stop the project if his
objections were sustained.' 4  Relief was denied. The following year,
in County of Siskiyou v. Gamlich,'5 the court ruled that a condemnee
could not introduce evidence questioning the necessity for a county road
or the appropriateness of its proposed location, notwithstanding that the
final location of the road as laid out by the board of supervisors did not
conform to the location suggested by the "viewers" appointed by the
board. The court said:
It was for the Board of Supervisors to determine whether a new
road was necessary or not, and, if necessary, over what route it
should be laid out and constructed.' 6
By 1900 a relatively firm rule had been established. Where the
legislature had created a tribunal to determine the necessity of a public
work after notice to affected parties and the opportunity for a hearing,
and if such tribunal stayed within the statute, it acquired the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether the work and the location were neces-
sary, and no subsequent review by the judiciary was authorized.'
7
10. Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
11. Id. at 253, 27 P. at 607.
12. Id. at 255-56, 27 P. at 608.
13. Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 35 P. 353 (1894).
14. id. at 19, 35 P. at 354. See also Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. LXXVI, §§ 1-5 at 70-71.
15. County of Siskiyou v. Gamlich, 110 Cal. 94, 42 P. 468 (1895).
16. Id. at 98, 42 P. at 469.
17. San Mateo County v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 63 P. 78 (1900).
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The average citizen who has had sufficient contact with adminis-
trative agencies to acquire a healthy skepticism about bureaucratic wis-
dom may marvel at this polyanna-like view of governmental decisions.
Yet it must be noted that all the cases above, and many others de-
cided in the same era,18 had a number of common features which can
explain judicial abstention. They involved projects of only local in-
terest and the condemnor who made the decision as to necessity and
location was an agency very close to the people. In addition, the ag-
grieved citizens had ample opportunity to fully air their views, and
none of the cases involved a factual situation so grossly unfair and un-
just that it cried for remedy by the judiciary-the City of Pasadena ob-
viously had to have a sewer; the Market Street extension was certainly
appropriate, if not in fact "necessary;" and farmers were entitled to
some public highway to reach their land.
What is most disturbing about the trends indicated by these cases
is the apparent predisposition of the court to decline review of "neces-
sity" questions. This attitude is evident from the contradictory ra-
tionales used by the court to support its abstention. In the Wulzen'
case, for example, when a landowner petitioned for certiorari to review
the resolution of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors declaring the
necessity for taking petitioner's land, the court held that the board's de-
termination was a "legislative" function. It thus avoided review under
the oft-cited rule that "certiorari does not lie to review the action
of an inferior tribunal or board in the exercise of purely legislative func-
tions which are not judicial in character. '20  On the other hand, when
the attack on the resolution of a county board of supervisors was made
by way of defense to the condemnation action, the court took comfort in
the principle of collateral estoppel, reasoning that, "[i]n laying out a
public road, the Board of Supervisors exercises judicial functions, and
its order approving the report of the viewers cannot be collaterally at-
tacked on the ground that it was made on insufficient evidence.' The
18. Sutter County v. Tisdale, 136 Cal. 474, 69 P. 141 (1902); Sonoma County v.
Crozier, 118 Cal. 680, 50 P. 845 (1896); Riverside County v. Alberhill Coal & Clay
Co., 34 Cal. App. 538, 168 P. 152 (1917). The general discretion afforded to public
agencies by these cases was, even then, being extended to private corporations supply-
ing public needs without reconsidering the rationale. Tuolumne Water Power Co. v.
Frederick, 13 Cal. App. 498, 110 P. 134 (1910); San Francisco & S.J.V. Ry. Co. v.
Leviston, 134 Cal. 412, 66 P. 473 (1901).
19. Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 21, 35 P. 353, 355 (1894).
20. Id. at 18, 35 P. at 354 (emphasis added).
21. County of Siskiyou v. Gamlich, 110 Cal. 94, 98, 42 P. 468, 469 (1895)
(emphasis added).
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court distinguished Pasadena v. Stimson,22 wherein such a review was
allowed, by observing that the Stimson case "was a direct proceeding
for condemnation of land, without any intermediate action taken be-
fore suit by any board or tribunal acting in a judicial capacity .... "
In 1913 the state legislature entered the picture, amending the law
to provide that approval by two-thirds of the governing board of coun-
ties, cities and towns (later extended to include nearly all special pur-
pose districts)
shall be conclusive evidence: (a) of the public necessity of such
proposed public utility or public improvement; (b) that such prop-
erty is necessary therefor, and (c) that such proposed public utility
or public improvement is planned or located in the manner which
would be most compatible with the greatest public good, and the
least private injury .... 24
Thus the way was cleared for some abuse of the power of emi-
nent domain, as evidenced in County of Los Angeles v. Rindge Co.25
The litigation discloses that some conflict had occurred between the
owners of a very large ranch outlying Los Angeles and the city fathers
over the public or private character of a road running through the ranch.
When the ranch owners closed the road at the ranch boundary and ex-
cluded the public the city decided to expropriate the road. A con-
demnation resolution was passed without any notice, actual or con-
structive, to the ranch owners. There was no opportunity for them to
be heard. In the condemnation suit which followed, the Rindge Com-
pany attempted to resist the taking by proving, inter alia, that the road
was unnecessary-it would go absolutely nowhere, but would end in a
cul de sac at the opposite side of the ranch. There was no existing or
planned highway with which it could or would connect. People living
on the ranch had free access over the private road to town, and no one
alleged, much less proved, that they were unhappy with the existing ar-
rangement.
Nevertheless, the California appellate court viewed the question
as a legislative issue and affirmed the order of condemnation. 20  The
22. 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
23. 110 Cal. at 100, 42 P. at 470 (emphasis added).
24. Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 293, § 1, at 549-50. Later, the benefits of this proviso
were extended to irrigation districts, public utility districts, water districts, school dis-
tricts, transit districts, rapid transit districts and sanitary and county sanitation dis-
tricts. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 465, § 2, at 1199; Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 254, § 1, at 939;
Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 802, § 1, at 1539; Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1036, § 3, at 1987; Cal.
Stat. 1957, ch. 1616, § 1, at 2961; Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 610, § 1, at 1760.
25. 53 Cal. App. 166, 200 P. 27 (1921), afJ'd, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
26. 53 Cal. App. 166, 200 P. 27 (1921).
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state supreme court apparently found nothing in the case to review.
Hearing the case on a writ of error, the United States Supreme Court
characterized the determination of the "necessity" issue as "purely politi-
cal," not the subject of any judicial inquiry, not a "judicial question,"
and said: "This power resides in the legislature, and may either be
exercised by the legislature or delegated by it to public officers.""7 The
considerations which, in earlier cases, had furnished a rationale for ju-
dicial abstention in planning and locating public works-i.e., the deci-
sion of an impartial administrative tribunal, the opportunity for notice
and hearing and at least some apparent justification for the project-
were absent in this case.
It was during this decade of the roaring twenties that the California
Legislature passed several bills which, coupled with the studied effort
of the state courts to avoid any role in the physical planning process, set
the stage for many of the serious sociological and environmental prob-
lems which now plague California. The legislature created the Division
of Highways and conferred on it the power of eminent domain.2" This
legislation provided that any resolution of the California Highway Com-
mission, an appointive board, which declares a highway or improve-
ment to be necessary and in the public interest is conclusive evidence
that the use is public, that the property can be taken as needed, and
that the location is most compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury.29
The California Supreme Court solidified its no-review policy
shortly thereafter, declaring in People v. Olsen"0 that the legislature dele-
gated to the California Highway Commission the exclusive authority to
determine the necessity for and location of highways. Nevertheless, the
court did hedge its decision, stating that the commission's determina-
tion could not be disputed "in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or an
abuse of discretion." 31  At this point in the development of the law,
the California Legislature and courts were in accord with the vast ma-
jority of the other states.32
27. 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
28. Now codified in CAL. STs. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 50-104.6.
29. Id. §§ 102-03.
30. People v. Olsen, 109 Cal. App. 523, 531, 293 P. 645, 648 (1930). Inter-
estingly enough, the court characterized the decision of the Highway Commission as a
judicial action, and also stated that the Highway Commission is a quasi-judicial body
for the purpose of determining necessity. Ordinarily, judicial review of some sort is
available over quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.
31. Id. at 531, 293 P. at 648.
32. Heisted, Recent Trends in Highway Condemnation Law, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q.
58, 60.
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I. Limited Judicial Review-Developments in Other
Jurisdictions
The law remained static in California until 1959, the condemnor
being permitted to freely plan and take property for public improve-
ments without fear of judicial review except in those cases where the
condemnee could sufficiently maintain the onerous burden of proving
the elusive concepts of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion. Never-
theless, had the development ended at this point there would have been
much cause for optimism. Even these limited grounds of review are
sufficient to permit a condemnee to resist condemnation in cases where
the project is potentially unsafe, illegal, in excess of authority or based
upon patently improper motives.33
Indeed, courts in other states are tending to construe these excep-
tions to the "no-review" rule with greater liberality,34 conforming to the
principle that "[t]o hold that these decisions cannot be reviewed, no
matter how arbitrary they may be, would be unsound and unjust,"35
and sometimes noting the insulation from the general public of the
agency making the decision.' An agency's actions in excess of its
statutory authority have been held to be an abuse of discretion,3" and
failure to hold required public hearings and follow other prescribed
procedures in making location and design decisions has sometimes in-
validated the decision.38 Judicial innovation has expanded these con-
cepts; the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Texas Eastern Transmission
Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc. 9 that a condemnor's refusal to con-
sider alternative locations for its project was arbitrary and an abuse of
discretion, giving the condemnee the right to present evidence of al-
ternative locations as a defense to a condemnation proceeding. The
Massachusetts high court, skeptical of giving any agency unrestrained
power to wreak havoc on the environment, has construed an appar-
ently broad legislative grant of power to that state's highway depart-
33. See text accompanying notes 1-5 & 25-27 supra.
34. See cases cited notes 35-40 infra.
35. Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
36. See, e.g., District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Arris, 391 F.2d
478, 484 (D.D.C. 1968); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). See also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471, 558 (1970).
37. Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Brown v.
McMorran, 42 Misc. 2d 211, 247 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
38. District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Assn's, Inc. v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754
(D.D.C. 1970).
39. Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 NJ. 261, 225
A.2d 130 (1966).
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ment in an extremely narrow fashion.40
State legislatures, too, have responded to the need for providing
some rein on the powers of highway departments and other public
agencies in their location and construction processes. Recent laws re-
quire that an opportunity be provided for increased public participa-
tion in or familiarity with the decisions in early stages, 4 or that local
public agencies be given significant voice, sometimes a veto, in the de-
cision making process.42 Montana has long permitted full judicial
review of the necessity for public works projects in condemnation
proceedings.4 3 Recently, the State of Vermont substantially revised its
highway location procedures to require a State Highway Board to hold
a hearing on the necessity of the highway and the proposed location,
after which the board must seek an "order of necessity" from the courts
prior to condemnation.44 Such order is granted only after full judi-
cial hearing in which the burden of proof is upon the highway board
to prove the necessity and location by a preponderance of the evidence.
There is no presumption of good faith or reasonable discretion.4 5
MI. The Finishing Touch-People ex rel. Department of
Public Works v. Chevalier
None of this legislative or judicial response to the needs of the
times has occurred in California. In fact, California appears to be mov-
ing in the opposite direction. Consider, for example, California's legis-
lation requiring the Division of Highways to consult closely with local
agencies
to assure all interested individuals, officials and civic or other
groups an opportunity to become acquainted with the studies being
made and to express their views with respect thereto .... 46
This statute, unfortunately, was not intended to be substantive. This is
clearly revealed by the concluding section:
Failure of the department or the commission to comply with the
requirements of this article shall not invalidate any action of the
commission as to the adoption of a routing for any state highway,
nor shall such failure be admissible evidence in any litigation for
40. Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577
(1969); Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967).
41. See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 47.52.133-.135 (1970).
42. E.g., MIcH. STATS. ANN. § 8.171(i) (1958); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 32-
4304 (1969 Supp.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2391.2(d) (1961); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 47.52.131-.180 (1970).
43. State Highway Comm'n v. Danielsen, 146 Mont. 539, 402 P.2d 443 (1965).
44. VT. STATS. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 222-28 (1968).
45. Id.
46. CAL. STS. & H'wAYs CODE § 210.
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the acquisition of rights-of-way or involving the allocating of funds
or the construction of the highway.
47
The most significant regressive activity, however, has been in the
area of judicial review. In 1959, the California Supreme Court removed
what little remained of judicial control over the aggressive designs of
public agencies intent upon development. In People ex rel. Depart-
ment of Public Works v. Chevalier" the court set the issue to rest in the
following language:
We therefore hold, despite the implications to the contrary in some
of the cases, that the conclusive effect accorded by the Legislature
to the condemning body's findings of necessity cannot be affected by
allegations that such findings were made as the result of fraud,
bad faith, or abuse of discretion. In other words, the questions of
the necessity for making a given public improvement, the neces-
sity for adopting a particular plan therefor, or the necessity for
taking particular property, rather than other property, for the pur-
pose of accomplishing such public improvement, cannot be made
justiciable issues even though fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion
may be alleged in connection with the condemning body's determi-
nation of such necessity. . . . We are therefore in accord with the
view that where the owner of land sought to be condemned for an
established public use is accorded his constitutional right to just
compensation for the taking, the condemning body's "motives or
reasons for declaring that it is necessary to take the land are no
concern of his."
'49
The opinion is devoid of any significant rationale or justification for
such a major pronouncement of public policy. It does recite the argu-
ments of the Department of Public Works (under which the Division
of Highways is organized) that to allow review where fraud, bad faith
or abuse of discretion were affirmatively pleaded
would allow public improvements to be unduly impeded by fre-
quent and prolonged litigation by persons whose only real conten-
tion is that someone else's property should be taken, rather than
their own.50
This argument, of course, assumes the issue; it is apparent that if the
public improvement is illegal, improperly authorized, unsafe or would
cause an undue amount of private injury, it should be "impeded."
The court in Chevalier also noted the state's argument "that prop-
erty owners do have considerable protection . . . since just compensa-
47. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 215. See jd. § 75.5 for a similar statute re-
garding location of state highways other than freeways.
48. 52 Cal. 2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959).
49. Id. at 307, 340 P.2d at 603, quoting County of Los Angeles v. Rindge Co.,
53 Cal. App. 166, 174, 200 P. 27, 31 (1921), ajfd, 262 U.S. 700 (1922).
50. Id. at 305, 340 P.2d at 602.
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tion must always be paid. . . .", This proposition is highly debat-
able;52 in any event, the court's only explicit rationale for its ruling was
the statement that:
To hold otherwise [i.e., to allow even limited review of necessity
questions] would not only thwart the legislative purpose in mak-
ing such determinations conclusive but would open the door to end-
less litigation, and perhaps conflicting determinations on the ques-
tion of "necessity" in separate condemnation actions brought to ob-
tain the parcels sought to carry out a single public improvement. 53
The impact of the Chevalier ruling, that the "conclusive" effect of
the condemning body's findings of necessity means "conclusive without
exception," is quite sweeping, since a "resolution of necessity" by nearly
all public condemning authorities is statutorily "conclusive" on the
issues of public use and necessity and on the finding that the public
benefit outweighs the private harm.54 The only significant condemning
agency whose determination to expropriate land is not statutorily "con-
clusive"-and is therefore reviewable-is the State Department of Parks
and Recreation. 55 Projects which will permanently change the land-
scape and have severe social and economic trauma associated with them
(such as freeways) are therefore unreviewable, while projects having
relatively minor environmental impact and which maintain the greatest
flexibility for future use are subject to judicial scrutiny.
In Chevalier the concept of due process to the landowner, em-
bodied in his opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal, and
due process to the public, embodied in governmental responsiveness to
all of the issues affecting the public interest, were not even mentioned.
As a result, when the question of the desirability of changing the land-
scape arises, "right" is what the highway commission says it is. All of
which leads the average landowner to the cynical comment articulated
to the author by a California rancher who has been subject to no less
than four separate condemnation actions: "You spend the first part of
your life working for the land, and the rest of your life trying to keep it."
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Kanner, When is "Property" Not "Property Itself': A Critical
Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent
Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 57 (1969).
53. People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 307,
340 P.2d 598, 603 (1959).
54. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241; CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 103.
Special districts created by specific legislation usually receive this same power. See,
e.g., the powers of the San Mateo County Flood Control District, CAL. WATER CODE
App. § 87-3.
55. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 5006.1. A determination by the State Department
of Parks and Recreation is prima facie evidence.
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IV. Public Projects and Quality of Life
To understand why society can no longer afford to allow the ju-
diciary to withdraw from an affirmative role in decisions affecting re-
sources management, it is necessary to bear in mind the enormously
complex impact that results from such decisions. A panel recently es-
tablished by the National Academy of Sciences to study the assessments
of technology has cataloged, by way of example only, a few of the far-
reaching problems resulting from decisions made from a limited, tech-
nological viewpoint:
[D]rilling rights were leased to oil companies operating in the
Santa Barbara channel without sufficient consideration of the possi-
ble effects of massive oil leakage near the coast and with inadequate
preventive measures to minimize the damages;. . . vast quantities
of chemicals have been released into the biosphere with little atten-
tion to their potential hazard;. .. the number of internal-combus-
tion automobiles has been allowed to mount steadily with only
sporadic efforts to study alternatives that would entail less pollution
and crowding. . . . Although . . . pesticides have undoubtedly
prevented a great many deaths from starvation and disease, it is
now apparent that they have also inflicted unintended but wide-
spread losses of fish and wildlife, and it is increasingly suspected
that they are causing injury to man.
. . . One can fly from London to New York in six hours and
then encounter difficulties getting from the airport to the city be-
cause the roads are often crowded and there is no rail service be-
tween the city and the major airports. 56
To this catalog we must also add freeways, the necessity, location
and design of which have generated widespread concern and bitter con-
troversies, sometimes resulting in physical violence. 5" This reaction is
understandable, for
[fireeways have done terrible things to cities in the past decade, and
and in many instances have almost irrevocably destroyed large sec-
tions of the cities which they were meant to serve. On the social
level, they not only have often devastated, more completely than
any bombing, vast acreages of houses which provided needed
low cost housing for families who could not afford higher rents,
but they have also wrecked neighborhoods whose old buildings had
great character and charm. . . . [The] freeway in the city has
been a great destroyer of neighborhood values.58
A specific example of the destruction of neighborhood values is the
proposed routing of Interstate 40 through the City of Nashville, which
56. Brooks & Bowers, The Assessment of Technology, ScerrFc AMimuA, Feb.
1970, at 13, 15, 18 [hereinafter cited as Brooks & Bowers].
57. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227-29 (1966).
58. L. HAIInnr, FAEEwAYs 24 (1966).
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was alleged to create a permanent barrier between the largely white com-
munity to the south and the largely black community of North Nash-
ville. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal noted in Nashville 1-40 Steer-
ing Committee v. Ellington:59
For example, it is shown that the blocking of other streets will
result in a heavy increase in traffic through the campus of Fisk
University [a predominantly Negro educational institution] and on
the street between this university and Meharry Medical College.
A public park used predominantly by Negroes will be destroyed.
Many business establishments owned by Negroes will have to be re-
located or closed.60
Too frequently the engineer's solution to the problem is simple: ease
the congestion by building another freeway,61 and solve the park prob-
lem by buying other park land elsewhere. 62  The creation of further
congestion by the new freeway and the location of the new park far
from the high-density population area where it is most severely needed
are apparently not considered significant.
The severe adverse effects of freeway location and construction are
not limited to urban areas. Freeways through the rural countryside
consume at least 40 acres per mile.6" Since freeway location is dictated
largely by economic considerations, which means ease of construction,
this acreage is almost always the same land which is the most fertile and
productive for agricultural purposes.6 4  Freeway construction requires
that mountains be lowered and valleys filled, with severe ecological con-
sequences. Rural communities are often totally destroyed, river beds
59. 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
60. Id. at 186.
61. See, e.g., District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 316 F.
Supp. 754, 780-81 (D.C. 1970). See also Covey, Freeway Interchanges: A Case Study
and an Overview, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 36 (1961).
62. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189
(W.D. Tenn. 1970).
63. As of 1967 all interstate highways were required to have a minimum
right-of-way width, exclusive of cuts, fills and ditches, of 150 feet, without frontage
roads or interchanges being considered. At this minimum width, highway right-of-way
would consume 18 acres per mile. For each foot of cut or fill required, an additional
4 feet of right-of-way is required on each side. States usually establish their own
minimum criteria which exceed this minimum. See L. RITrER & R. PAQUETrE, HIGH-
WAY ENGINEERING 181-86 (3rd ed. 1967). Experienced highway engineers and pro-
fessors of engineering have reported to the author that because of wide slopes and
other state criteria increasing the median width, requiring drainage ditches of certain
sizes alongside the roadway, and minimum right-of-way fence set backs, right-of-way
for interstate highways averages 40 acres per mile, without interchanges.
64. A review of some basic texts on highway location and design confirms that
consideration is given only to economics, traffic counts, soil and geologic conditions and
"highway-needs studies." Aesthetics are considered as they relate to traffic safety
and highway beautification, after the fact. See, e.g., L. RrrrER & R. PAQUETTE,
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and stream beds are frequently rechanneled, and drainage and run-off
patterns are blithely changed to suit highway needs, all without any
serious consideration given to their long-range effects.65 Furthermore,
ease of travel stimulates larger numbers of vehicles, and studies have
confirmed that the lead emissions from automobiles driving through
the countryside find their way into the agricultural crops growing along-
side the roadways, thence into food and thence into the human body.6
The National Academy of Sciences panel has recognized the urgent
demand for expanding the frame of reference within which these critical
decisions are made. It further noted that there is sufficient knowledge
and ability available to evaluate the long-range effect of such projects:
The experience [with pesticides] suggests that carefully de-
signed experiments in the early days might have influenced the
technology of pesticides before the nation was so committed to
certain forms of pest control as to make any significant alteration
of the technology extremely difficult. Knowledge has advanced
to the point where, in spite of many uncertainties, it is possible to
predict at least some of the ecological effects of building another
Aswan dam or opening a sea-level canal through the Isthmus of
Panama, or the effects of paving and housing on the reflectivity of
the earth's surface, or the effects of high-altitude aircraft exhaust on
the radiation balance of the earth. The panel saw an obligation to
undertake the necessary research and monitoring at the earliest
possible stages of development.
67
Congress has expressed a similar philosophy through the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.68 Among other things, that act
directs all federal agencies to use an interdisciplinary approach in the
planning of projects to ensure that "presently unquantified environmen-
tal amenities and values are given appropriate consideration in de-
cision making. . . ,"9 Prior to any approval of legislation or other
major federal action affecting the environment, the concerned agency
must prepare a detailed report relative to the project's environmental im-
pact, its unavoidable adverse effects, alternatives, and any irreversible
HIGHWAY ENGn1EERNG (3rd ed. 1967). One author recognizes the need to consider
intangibles more fully than has been done in the past. R. WwNFREY, ECONomac
ANALYSIS FoR HIGHWAYS 552-83 (1969).
65. Id.
66. Chow, Lead Accumulation in Roadside Soil and Grass, 225 NATUE 295
(1970); Motto, Daines, Chilko & Motto, Lead in Soils and Plants: Its Relationship to
Traffic Volume and Proximity to Highways, 4 ENvL SCL & TEnc. 231 (Mar. 1970).
See also Dedolph, Tel Haar, Holtzman & Lucus, Sources of Lead in Perennial Rye-
grass and Radishes, 4 ENV'L Sci. & TECH. 217 (Mar. 1970); Tel Haar, Air as a
Source of Lead in Edible Crops, 4 ENV'L Scd. & TECH. 226 (Mar. 1970).
67. Brooks & Bowers, supra note 56, at 15.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
69. Id. § 4332(C).
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and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved."
President Nixon's Executive Order 71 further expands the role of fed-
eral agencies in environmental protection, and specific legislation at
both the state and federal level is designed to insure that certain speci-
fied amenities, such as historical places and buildings and parks and
recreational facilities, are given some measure of protection from the
highwayman's bulldozer.
72
Still, the ultimate decision as to whether to construct a public im-
provement, and where and how to construct it, is made by a special pur-
pose government agency, often with the support of some legislation
which the agency has sponsored and advocated. There is justifiable
skepticism as to the ability of such agencies to broaden their horizons
sufficiently to protect the public interest, notwithstanding legislative
mandates or rules and regulations requiring them to do so:
Within the set of governmental and market processes the
initial assessment of the costs and benefits of alternative technolo-
gies is normally undertaken by those who seek to exploit them. As
a result the frame of reference is often quite limited. Although
such groups as professional societies and conservation organizations
may add inputs to the evaluation, the assessment is usually based
on the contending interests of those who already recognize their
stake in the technology and are prepared to enter the public arena
to defend their position. In all but a few cases, usually when
Congress takes a special interest, no other assessment occurs. The
central question asked is what will the technology do for the eco-
nomic and institutional interests of those who want to exploit it or
to the interests of those with a stake in competing technologies. If
the technology leads to social problems, they are usually recognized
only when they have reached serious proportions and generated
acute public concern. 73
In theory, administrative decisions are kept within reasonable
bounds by the courts' exercising a limited power of review." Logi-
cally, as the courts become increasingly aware of the seriousness and ir-
reversibility of decisions affecting the environment, the scrutiny should
70. Id.
71. Exec. Order No. 11,507, 35 Fed. Reg. 2573 (1970). The executive order
establishes standards and pollution control and abatement procedures for federal fa-
cilities and installations.
72. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (Supp. II, 1966) (historical buildings and sites);
CAL. CODE Cxv. PRoc. §§ 1241(3) (property already devoted to public use), 1241.7
(park, recreation, wildlife and historical areas).
73. Brooks & Bowers, supra note 56 at 16-18.
74. "Absent any evidence to the contrary, Congress may rather be presumed to
have intended that the courts should fulfill their traditional role of defining and main-
taning the proper bounds of administrative discretion and safeguarding the rights of
the individual." Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1966).
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become closer. Recent cases,rs both state and federal, seem to point in
this direction-except in California.
V. Can Public Agencies Protect the Public Interest?
The California Supreme Court has attempted to rationalize its total
refusal to see or to hear any criticism of condemnation decisions by
utilizing an archaic, court-created presumption of regularity. The
court presumes, conclusively, without exception, and as a matter of law,
that the Division of Highways, charged with promoting and developing
highway transportation systems, has carefully and sympathetically con-
sidered alternative means of transport and all relevant ecological, so-
ciological and economic information in determining whether and where
to lay-out and to build the next freeway. It is as reasonable to presume
that the fox will properly guard the henhouse.
The fallacy of this presumption is evident from a review of the
highway decision-making process. First, decisions affecting the num-
ber, location and design of freeways are made by engineers of the Di-
vision of Highways, who are ill-equipped through education or experi-
ence to evaluate ecological or sociological problems.: 6 Second, where
hearings are required to increase the "frame of reference" for the deci-
sion-makers, they give every appearance of being a pro-forma per-
formance. They are usually chaired by a highway official, whose natu-
ral predisposition and bias is so obvious that it has been judicially rec-
ognized-although not in California. Notices of the hearing are often
carelessly given or inconspicuously posted; microphones are unavailable
to other than proponents of the project; and equipment malfunctions
sometimes prevent an accurate transcript of the "hearing."
7 8
In addition, the "mission orientation" of a single-purpose public
agency tends to obscure whatever objective analysis exists. Very rarely
75. See cases cited notes 1, 2, 5, & 35-40 supra.
76. Two excellent decisions describing in detail the highway location procedure
in two controversial cases are Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), and District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Volpe, 316 F.
Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970). See also Pressures in the Process of Administrative Deci-
sion: A Study of Highway Location, 108 U. P.. L. REv. 534 (1960). Note the
absence of disciplines other than engineering in the design, location and approval
process.
77. Glass v. Mackie, 370 Mich. 482, 486-87, 122 N.W.2d 651, 653 (1963). See
also Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 661-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1967):
"IT]his attitude on the part of highway officials toward highways in general does not
necessarily make their selection of a particular route arbitrary or capricious."
78. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1192-93
(W.D. Tenn. 1970); Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179, 183-84
(6th Cir. 1967).
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does the agency entertain the thought that the criticisms of its decision
may have merit. Quite the contrary is often true. Where a decision of
such an agency is questioned, the considerable resources of the agency
are marshalled to defend and implement that program as conceived,
regardless of the cost."
This "damn the torpedoes" attitude was recently demonstrated in
San Luis Obispo County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dis-
trict v. DeVauls,80 a rare California case in which the condemnee was
permitted to challenge the necessity of the taking. A county flood con-
trol district sought to take a 600 acre ranch for a water supply and rec-
reation reservoir. The law then in force provided that the district's
"resolution of necessity" was only prima facie evidence of the necessity
of the taking and that the project was consistent with the greatest public
good and least private injury. The condemnee introduced expert testi-
mony showing, inter alia, that the proposed dam would very likely stop
the recharge of a ground-water aquifier relied upon for the intensive ir-
rigation of the fertile valley downstream, in violation of the downstream
owners' water rights, and would probably increase the already serious
problem of salt-water intrusion. As a result of a special setting which
advanced the case on the trial calendar, the condemnee's witnesses
were forced to testify after only 2 months of investigation. Yet this was
the only investigation ever made into those problems. The district's
witnesses admitted that they had not studied them, while at the same
time denying that they existed.
The trial judge, entirely missing the point, ruled that the condemnee
had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed
dam definitely would have the adverse effects projected by his wit-
nesses, and allowed construction to commence. The flood control dis-
trict apparently did not, either before or after the trial or during con-
struction, attempt to study the impact of the project upon the surface
or the ground water supplies in the fertile valley downstream, or of the
salt-water intrusion problem. The objection here made is not that the
dam was constructed, but that the district apparently proceeded with-
out ever considering these factors, even after it knew of competent evi-
dence indicating the possibility of serious adverse consequences.
79. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo County Flood Control & Water Conservation
Dist. v. DeVauls, Civil No. 32427 (San Luis Obispo Co. Superior Court, Apr. 21, 1967
judgment amended, Aug. 10, 1970); District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970); Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington,
387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
80. Civil No. 32427 (San Luis Obispo Co. Superior Ct. Apr. 21, 1967).
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Reported cases from other jurisdictions also illustrate the extent
to which institutional loyalty supersedes objective analysis of previous de-
cisions. Where objective court review is sought, the agency frequently
attempts to attack the standing of the objectors to raise the question or
argues that the agency's action is immune from judicial review.8' If
this procedural approach fails, the agency then vigorously argues for a
very narrow, restrictive interpretation of the statute or regulation al-
leged to have been violated."2 The spirit of the law is disregarded.
For example, in South Hill Neighborhood Association v. Rom-
ney, 83 a citizen's group sued to prevent an urban renewal project from
destroying seven historical buildings listed in the National Register of
Historic Places, on the grounds that the Department of Housing and
Urban Development had failed to consider their historic value and had
failed to submit the question of preservation of the buildings to the Ad-
visory Council on Historic Preservation, as required by statute.8 4 The
federal and local agencies urged upon the court a construction of the
statute which would limit its operation to only those buildings which had
been on the Historical Register prior to the time federal funds were
committed for the project. The court agreed with this argument and
allowed demolition of the buildings, notwithstanding the expressed policy
of Congress to seriously consider and preserve the nation's historical
heritage, and despite the listing of the buildings on the National Register
more than 3 months before a regional federal engineer orally approved
the local agency's demolition plan.
Similarly, the Farmers Home Administration recently sought to
avoid complying with the Environmental Policy Act's requirement to
review and to report upon the environmental impact of a program it
was funding on the grounds that the paper work was largely completed
prior to the effective date of the act, totally ignoring petitioner's objec-
tions of serious ecological damage which would result from the project.
Happily, this argument was unsuccessful.85
81. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm.
v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afi'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); District
of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Airis, 391 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
82. District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754
(D.D.C. 1970); South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970); Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Elling-
ton, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
83. 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1075 (1970).
84. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(a)-(f) (Supp. V, 1970).
85. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, 1BNA ENV. REP.
Decisions 1303 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 1970), appeal dismissed as moot, 430 F.2d 1315
(5th Cir. 1970).
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One of the most recent and cogent illustrations of the length to
which public agencies will go in attempting to justify ill-considered de-
cisions is Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe.86 In
that case citizens objected to construction of the Hudson River Express-
way in New York on the grounds that the construction would require
filling significant amounts of the Hudson river, an illegal act unless
Congress had expressly authorized it. The citizen's committee relied
upon a federal statute which expressly provides:
It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction
of any bridge, dam, dike or causeway over or in any . . . navigable
river. . . of the United States until the consent of Congress to the
building of such structures shall have been obtained. .... 87
Congressional authorization for the project had never been obtained.
Nevertheless, the project was commenced and litigation challenging the
right to do so was vigorously defended. The arguments of the highway
men are best set forth in the words of the court:
The defendants, while accusing the plaintiffs of arguing semantics,
postulate that what is called a dike (by the various engineers who
prepared the plans for the State Department of Transportation and
the Corps of Engineers) is not really a dike since a real dike has a
different purpose from their dikes ...
The defendants urged that Congress, in using the term "dike"
in 1899, meant a structure that would be within the definition set
forth in Chambers Technical Dictionary, p. 273 . . . which was
originally published in 1940. ...
We hold. . . that Congress when it said "any dike" over or in
any navigable river meant exactly that. s8
Unbending loyalty often leads otherwise honest and competent
employees to resort to devices more drastic than mere semantics in at-
tempting to justify their own or their employer's decison. In a recent
case involving the disputed location of the Three Sisters Bridge in Wash-
ington, D.C., highway officials and their attorneys, after unsuccessfully
opposing judicial inquiry into the decision-making process, "manufac-
tured" evidence in the form of subsequent inter-office memos in an at-
tempt to prove that they had complied with the mandate of certain
statutes and regulations. 89
Another factor inhibiting objective decision-making by the highway
departments is the heavy pressure imposed by the federal aid programs
designed for the construction of the interstate highway system. The
federal statute requires that federal funds be paid out by the end of the
86. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
88. 302 F. Supp. at 1088.
89. District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754,
770 n.31, 785 n.52 (D.D.C. 1970).
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second year after the state and the Federal Governments have signed the
highway project agreement;90 "the threat of losing federal money [there-
fore] creates strong pressure to bend state policies and laws in the way
that will most quickly build the highway."'" As a result of the con-
gressional declaration that "'the prompt and early completion of the
national system of defense and interstate highways. . . is essential to
the national interest,' . . . highway engineers frequently propose
routing an interstate along the cheapest and straightest of alternative
routes.
9 2
The foregoing illustrations should serve to confirm or reinforce
what the average man-in-the-street already knows-that it is unrealistic
to expect a public agency created to promote, build and maintain a
highway system throughout the state to entertain any point of view which
conflicts with this mission, and that the enactment of a statute directing
consideration of other viewpoints is not going to change things. A
single-purpose, mission-oriented public agency cannot, by definition,
protect the public interest, which by definition requires competent con-
sideration of a variety of factors.
It is evident that the presumption utilized in California to avoid
judicial review of the necessity or location of a proposed public work is
the kind of "fading presumption" to which Judge (now Chief Justice)
Berger referred when he wrote:
The theory that the [Federal Communications Commission] can
always effectively represent the listener interests . . . without the
aid and participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfill-
ing the role of private attorneys general is one of those assumptions
we collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably ade-
quate. When it becbmes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no
longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of
actual experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to
rely on it.93
In view of the ever-broadening powers of condemnation and the very
serious environmental consequences resulting therefrom, the continued
refusal of California courts to critically review the decision-making
process is judicial naivet6 in the extreme.
VI. Is Judicial Review Practical?
There are other reasons, besides the "presumption of regularity,"
90. 23 U.S.C. § 118(b) (1964).
91. Tippy, Review of Route Selections for the Federal Highway Systems, 27
MONT. L. REv. 131, 135 (1965).
92. Id.
93. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1004 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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which are urged to support the condemnor's argument that a court
should abstain from inquiry into the necessity or location of the pro-
posed public work. These arguments proceed along more pragmatic
lines.
The first of these is that if the court permits any condemnee to
question a project, such as a highway, which involves taking the land of
a number of landowners, the project will be plagued by continuous de-
lays while each landowner separately litigates the necessity of the taking
or the desirability of the location.94 Such an argument distorts reality
by ignoring the extensive costs of litigation. Furthermore, even if every
landowner were resolved to oppose the condemnation in court, the con-
demnor's attorney, who completely controls the action from the stand-
point of determining when the complaints are filed and against whom,
could move to bifurcate the trial into the "necessity" question and the
compensation issues and consolidate the trial of all cases raising the
necessity question. Where landowners contest the necessity of the tak-
ing without any evidence a motion for summary judgment in favor of
the condemnor on the necessity issue could expediently dispose of
that defense. In short, by a comparatively easy modification of con-
demnation practices, a desirable project can be completed economically
and with minimum delay, while still permitting landowners to seek ju-
dicial review of the necessity for the taking of their lands.
It is apparent, of course, that a project which is of questionable
value and necessity ought not proceed until those issues are finally re-
solved. The typical condemnor's argument-that judicial review should
be avoided because it only delays the project-can therefore be put aside
as so much make-weight.
Another pragmatic argument against judicial review in condemna-
tion suits is that the condemnor may find himself in a perplexing situa-
tion if one court finds the original location of the project unnecessary
and in a subsequent action another court determines an alternative route
is unnecessary, and so forth. This argument caught the fancy of the
California Supreme Court in 1891 in Pasadena v. Stimson,95 where the
court said:
And we think that when an attempt is made to show that the loca-
tion made is unnecessarily injurious the proof ought to be clear and
convincing, for otherwise no location could ever be made. If the
first selection made on behalf of the public could be set aside on
slight or doubtful proof, a second selection would be set aside in the
same manner, and so ad infinitum. . . . [I]mprovement could
94. People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 305, 340 P.2d 598, 602 (1959).
95. 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
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never be secured, because, whatever location was proposed, it
could be defeated by showing another just as good.9 6
The self-defeating aspects of that argument apparently never occurred
to the court, sitting in a state which was still frontier in many respects.
For if the prospective condemnor could never find a location which
could be determined to be compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury, he obviously ought not construct the project.
Another argument nearly always heard on this question is that ju-
dicial review is inappropriate at the stage when condemnation proceed-
ings are initiated because, by that time: (1) the financial arrangements
have been made; (2) the contracts to construct the project have been
let;9 7 or (3) the project has already been commenced on land previously
taken. This argument is an equitable one, equivalent to laches, except
that the equities seem to favor the condemnee. Since the condemnor
has full control over the commencement of a condemnation action, and
as the condemnee has no standing to bring an action challenging the
determination of necessity,98 it is grossly inequitable to prohibit a con-
demnee from questioning the taking because the suit against him was
not filed until the project reached advanced stages.
Here again, a revision of the condemnor's land acquisition proce-
dures can alleviate any problem which arises during condemnation.
Acquisition of land for highway projects which are constructed in seg-
ments can be acquired in equivalent segments. Condemnation com-
plaints could be issued against the holdout landowners, and since an at-
tack on the necessity of the project is only by affirmative defense, the
condemnor would quickly know to what extent the project would be
challenged for that segment. If the project were contested, and there
were no triable issue of fact, the matter could be resolved by summary
judgment. If there were no contest, the project could proceed as
scheduled.
It is conceded that there will necessarily be some delay to some de-
sirable projects if a condemnee is permitted to test the necessity of the
project as a defense to the taking of his land. Considering, however,
the limited amount of land resources available, the permanence of the
public work and the serious nature of its ramifications, a well-planned
and well-thought-out project which is truly in the public interest will
not be significantly harmed by a delay of even 12 to 24 months. If a
project is based on so precarious a footing that it will topple if its mo-
96. Id. 255-56, 27 P. at 608.
97. Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
98. See notes 6 & 8 & accompanying text supra.
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mentum is reduced or lost, such an argument should present a prima
facie case against the necessity of the project.
Finally, it might be argued that courts are incompetent to pass
judgment on questions involving location of public work projects be-
cause of the necessarily complex nature of such decisions.9 This argu-
ment, however, is as devoid of rational support as the others. California
courts are not now, nor have they ever been, incapable of determining
complex sociological and technical issues. The court has been in the
forefront of major changes in criminal justice, 100 civil rights,' 0 ' defacto
segregation, 02 and minority-group voting, 03 to name only a few social
issues. On the technical side, the court could rarely be presented with
cases involving more complex technology than those in which it is re-
quired to apportion the state's scarce water resources among a multi-
tude of competing uses. Yet in 1938, the California Supreme Court
ordered a trial court to work out a physical solution to resolve compet-
ing water-users' demands, considering water available from surface
stream flow, springs, underground flow and underground reservoirs. 04
As far back as 1903, responding to an argument that the court had in-
sufficient capability to deal with complex problems of underground wa-
ters, and therefore must avoid any judicial activity in this field, the
court said:
99. This argument-that courts should not involve themselves in second-guessing
the experts-is not often articulated so bluntly, but the thread of it appears in some
cases. E.g., District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754,
770-71 (D.D.C. 1970): "The court is merely reviewing the actions of the Secretary to
determine whether they have a basis in fact, and that they do not amount to an
abuse of discretion. The wisdom of the statutory scheme of committing such decisions
to administrative officials experienced in the area of their jurisdiction, rather than to
the courts, is evident in the present situation." Similarly, in Boomer v. Atlantic Ce-
ment Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1970), a
citizen's action against an air polluter, the court said: "[lit seems manifest that the
judicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can
pronounce nor prepared to lay down and implement an effective policy for the
elimination of air pollution."
100. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1964), was the first case to require proof that the defendant have objective knowledge
of the victim's minority in a statutory rape case.
101. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966),
affd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Supreme Court upheld the California high court's in-
validation of proposition 14 as a legislative act encouraging private discrimination in
the sale of housing.
102. Id.
103. Castro v. California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970),
struck down a California constitutional provision making the ability to read English
a prerequisite of voting.
104. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938).
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The objection that this rule of correlative rights will throw upon
the court a duty impossible of performance, that of apportioning an
insufficient supply of water among a large number of users, is
largely conjectural. No doubt cases can be imagined where the
task would be extremely difficult, but if the rule is the only just
one, as we think has been shown, the difficulty in its application
in extreme cases is not a sufficient reason for rejecting it and
leaving property without any protection from the law.10 5
These are hardly words from a court incompetent to handle complex
issues.
VII. Conclusion
Americans are only now beginning to realize the many facets of
"public interest" and to appreciate that the decision to spend public
monies to build public works requiring permanent changes of our di-
minishing natural resources must be made only after long, thoughtful
and objective analysis considering a wide variety of viewpoints. The
recent enactments by the Federal Government requiring public hear-
ings in highway location cases, the Environmental Policy Act and the
Presidential Executive Order issued thereunder are salutary first steps
in reversing the existing trend. But they are only first steps. Yet to be
developed is an ultimate means of balancing conflicting viewpoints and
arriving at a sound determination of what public works are within the
public interest.
One possibility is the creation of a "super-agency" in the state with
the power to license public agencies to condemn private property for a
given public work after extensive public hearings and inquiries, with all
parties having the right of cross examination. Ultimate appeal from
such an agency to a court would have to be provided, the extent of which
would depend upon the composition of the agency, its methods and
the possibility of abuse of power.
On the other hand, the National Academy of Sciences report rec-
ommends the creation of an agency which would be responsible for in-
dependently evaluating and assessing proposed technological changes
within the realm of each branch of the Federal Government. To main-
tain their credibility among diverse interests, such an agency would not
have any policy-making authority, regulatory powers or responsibility
for promoting any particular technology. Nor would it be given au-
thority to screen new technological undertakings, since such a power
might discourage innovation. In the views of the panel, the agency
"should be empowered to study and recommend but not to act; it must
105. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 136, 74 P. 766, 772 (1903).
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be able to evaluate but not to sponsor or prevent." 06 It would be de-
signed to influence, and thus would be situated close to the seat of the
executive and legislative power. Existing institutions would operate
much as they now do, but would be under varying degrees of influence
from these technological assessment groups.' Presumably, the court
would still maintain its traditional review, where necessary.
The mechanism by which a landowner challenges the necessity or
location of the proposed public work as a defense to a condemnation ac-
tion is not the most desirable one for ensuring complete and full con-
sideration of the public interest in highway location decisions. Nor is
court review guaranteed to prevent all or most of the abuses of the con-
demnation power which are now condoned. But in the absence of any
single agency capable of determining all of these questions, judicial re-
view is an absolutely necessary intermediate step.
The general trend throughout the country is certainly in the direc-
tion of increasingly critical judicial review. The courts, responding to
the clamor for more responsive and objective decisions, are taking in-
creased notice of the insulation and bias of the sponsoring agencies,
usually highway departments. While it is still the general rule through-
out most of the country that decisions locating highways or other public
works projects will not be reviewed by courts except in cases of fraud,
bad faith or abuse of discretion, there is a distinct and growing trend to
liberalize those concepts and thus provide greater judicial scrutiny of
those decisions.
There is absolutely no question that there must be substantial im-
provement in the process for planning public works.""8 Suggestions for
such changes vary, but all agree that the process must include adequate
representation of the variety of viewpoints which go into the definition
of "public interest." But until such an ultimate process is developed, we
must live with what we have; and we cannot permit environmental deg-
radation by single-purpose agencies to continue until the perfect solu-
tion is found.
Notwithstanding its imperfections, the mechanism of judicial review
of administrative decisions is sufficiently flexible to protect the public
interest in a quality environment without major changes in judicial
106. Brooks & Bowers, supra note 56, at 20.
107. Id.
108. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judi-
cial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. Rav. 471 (1970); Brooks & Bowers supra note 56, Tippy,
Review of Route Selections for the Federal Highway Systems, 27 MONT. L. REV. 51, 131
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process. By liberally interpreting the concepts of "arbitrariness" or
"abuse of discretion," the court can expand the scope of its review.
Further, the courts can make their determinations on a more flexible
and realistic basis by adopting as the standard of review the yardstick
suggested by the panel of the National Academy of Sciences:
[A] basic principle of decision-making should be to maintain the
greatest practicable latitude for future action. Other things being
equal, the technological projects that should be favored are the ones
that leave maximum room for maneuver. The reversibility of an
action should thus be counted as a major benefit, its irreversibility
as a major cost.109
In highway location problems, the court is presently the first and
only forum in which objectors to the location or necessity of the project
can obtain a fair and impartial hearing, together with the all-important
right to cross-examine highway officials. Since the court is the first
forum which can adequately protect the public interest, its responsibility
is analogous to that of the Federal Power Commission in licensing proj-
ects involving water resources: it must "affirmatively protect the public
interest"; it cannot adopt the role of the umpire "blandly calling balls
and strikes for adversaries appearing before it. . .... 110 Courts have
the power to call upon independent referees. They can, on their own
motion, appoint one or more qualified experts to testify as friends of
the court on matters affecting the public interest, regardless of whether
the parties raise the questions.
Courts must be permitted a significant amount of discretion in
the handling of such cases. And while some complaints about judicial
abuse of discretion can be expected, there is no doubt that the approval
of a controversial highway project after a full and extensive hearing, in
the exercise of judicial discretion, is vastly more credible than the ap-
proval of such a project by a highway engineer under the present cir-
cumstances. The judicial mechanism, if handled by judges bent on a
realistic protection of the broad public interest, can do much to prevent
the sacrifice of our vital national resources on the altar of short term
expedience. But to reach this goal in California requires the immediate
overruling, judicially or legislatively, of the unrealistic and deadly case of
People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Chevalier.
109. Brooks & Bowers 15.
110. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965).
February 1971] CONDEMNATION IN CALIFORNIA

